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NOTES
A RECKLESSNESS STANDARD FOR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN SECTION
1983 ACTIONS
Smith v. Wade1
Punitive damages are a potent weapon in the enforcement of civil rights.2
In appropriate circumstances, a jury is permitted to assess nearly any amount
it believes necessary to punish and deter violations of civil rights.3 Federal
courts have long allowed punitive awards in a variety of civil rights actions.4
1. 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983).
2. See generally S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION:
A GUIDE TO § 1983, §§ 4.08-4.12 (1979); Annot, 14 A.L.R. FED. 608 (1973).
Most cases to date have been brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982); the Civil Rights Act of 1870, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1982); and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). There
is little case law concerning the availability of punitive damages under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h(6) (1982).
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1968, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1982), is
the only federal civil rights statute containing an express provision covering punitive
damages, there are few decisions interpreting this provision.
3. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.11 (1978). An award of punitive dam-
ages is beyond that necessary to compensate the injured plaintiff and often has little or
no relationship to the extent of injury. See Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965)
(punitive damages permitted in the absence of actual damage). The jury has great
discretion in the amount of punitive damages it may award. An award of punitive
damages will not be overturned absent a showing that it is grossly excessive or "is so
high as to shock the judicial conscience." Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 56-57 (2d Cir.
1978).
4. See Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965) (leading case for proposi-
tion that punitive damages may be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Hague v. Com-
mittee for Indus. Org., 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir.) (earliest case recognizing the possibility
of awarding punitive damages in a civil rights action), modified on other grounds, 307
U.S. 496 (1939); see also Cofield v. City of Atlanta, 648 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1981)
(punitive damages awarded for deprivation of free speech and assembly); Busche v.
Burkee, 649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1981) (due process); Vetters v. Berry, 575 F.2d 90 (6th
Cir. 1978) (freedom from unlawful assault or arrest); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d
178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971) (prisoner's right's), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, cert. denied,
405 U.S. 978 (1972); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1968) (per curiam)
(the right to privacy), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
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Their decisions, however, have been marked by confusion and disagreement
over the proper standard of culpability for such an award.'
In Smith v. Wade, a closely divided United States Supreme Court held
that a jury may assess punitive damages in a section 1983 action6 if they find
the defendant's conduct involved "a reckless or callous disregard of, or indif-
ference to, the rights or safety of others." A jury need not find an intent to
cause harm.7 Further, the Court held that recklessness is the appropriate stan-
dard even when the standard for compensatory liability is also recklessness or
its equivalent.8 The decision was the product of an exhaustive survey of Amer-
ican tort law. The dissenters rejected the majority's methodology and were
persuaded that policy considerations made intent the more suitable punitive
standard for section 1983.1 While the Court's holding rests on generally ac-
cepted tort priniciples, it is unfortunate that the majority gave only cursory
treatment to the legitimate policy concerns that favor limiting the availability
5. Some courts, for example, appear to require a recklessness standard. See,
e.g., Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1978) (knowledge or reckless
disregard); Silver v. Cormier, 529 F.2d 161, 163-164 (10th Cir. 1976) (reckless indif-
ference, ill will, a desire to injure, or malice). Other cases appear to require conduct
beyond recklessness. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971)
(pattern of inappropriate behavior), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, cert. denied, 405 U.S.
978 (1972);'Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1970)
(willfully and in gross disregard); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir.)
(per curiam) (evil intent), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); Pierce v. Stinson, 493 F.
Supp. 609, 612 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (malice); Jones v. Institutional Classification
Comm., 374 F. Supp. 706, 714 (W.D. Va. 1974) (actual malice); United States ex rel.
Motley v. Rundle, 340 F. Supp. 807, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (malicious actions in gross
disregard); Sexton v. Gibbs, 327 F. Supp. 134, 142-143 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (willful or
malicious), affd, 446 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the. deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
7. 103 S. Ct. at 1628. This note employs the term "intent" to describe the
standard argued for by the petitioner, instead of the term "actual malice" which he
used. The petitioner defined "actual malice" to include "ill will, spite, or intent to in-
jure." Id. at 1630. The petitioner did not use "actual malice" as the Court has in
defamation cases to refer to recklessness. Id.; see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 280 (1964). This note uses "intent" to avoid the confusion surrounding the
term "actual malice." See 103 S. Ct at 1630-31 n.6; 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 250
(1965). "Recklessness" is the term employed to describe the less restrictive standard
approved by the Court. See infra text accompanying notes 62-66. Much of the confu-
sion surrounding the culpability required to justify an award of punitive damages can
be attributed to judicial terminology. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 249 (1965); note
5 supra.
8. 103 S. Ct. at 1640.
9. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 1658 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 49
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Smith v. Wade arose in 1976, when eighteen year old Daniel Wade was
transfered to administrative segregation at the Algoa Reformatory in Mis-
souri.10 Wade was placed in a cell with another inmate. Later the same day,
prison guard William Smith placed a third inmate in Wade's cell. That night
Wade's two cellmates beat and raped him. Wade sued Smith and four other
correction officers, alleging that his eighth amendment rights had been
violated."1
Although the evidence was insufficient to prove that Smith intended to
cause Wade harm, it indicated that Smith knew or had reason to know that an
assault was likely to occur. 2 The district court judge instructed the jury that
if it found that Smith had acted with reckless disregard of, or indifference to
Wade's rights or safety, then it could assess punitive damages in order to pun-
ish and deter such conduct." The jury found for Wade and awarded $25,000
for compensatory damages and $5,000 for punitive damages. A divided panel
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit approved the
punitive damage jury instruction and upheld the punitive damage award. 4
10. Wade had been in protective custody because of prior incidents of violence
against him. Id. at 1627.
11. The district court directed a verdict for two of the correction officers and
the jury found for the other two but against Smith. Id. at 1628.
12. The third inmate had been placed in administrative segregation for fighting.
At the time Smith placed the third inmate in Wade's cell, at least one other available
cell held only one inmate. Smith made no effort to check whether another cell was
available. The prison had an unwritten policy of segregating general population in-
mates from inmates in protective custody. In addition, just a few weeks earlier another
inmate had been beaten to death while Smith was on duty. Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d
778, 781 (8th Cir. 1981), ajJ'd, 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983).
13. The instruction on punitive damages read in relevant part:
In addition to actual damages, the law permits the jury, under certain
circumstances, to award the injured person punitive and exemplary damages,
in order to punish the wrongdoer for some extraordinary misconduct, and to
serve as an example or warning to others not to engage in such conduct.
If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff, and if the conduct of one or
more of the defendants is shown to be a reckless or callous disregard of, or
indifference to, the rights or safety of others, then you may assess punitive or
exemplary damages in addition to any award of actual damages.
• . . The amount of punitive or exemplary damages assessed against any
defendant may be such sum as you believe will serve to punish that defendant
and to deter him and others from like conduct.
103 S. Ct. at 1628. This instruction varied little from the standard jury instruction
under Missouri law. MAI 10.02 (1978 Revision).
14. Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1981), afl'd, 103 S. Ct. 1625
(1983). The majority noted the split among the circuits as to the proper standard for
punitive damages. It reasoned that malice may be inferred from a dereliction of duties
amounting to recklessness and that this conduct should be deterred. Id. at 786. It also
cited federal case law to support the proposition that a finding of liability against a
prison official in a section 1983 action automatically triggers the jury's consideration of
punitive damages. Id. at 785. Judge Gibson dissented and argued that an award of
1984]
3
Brewer: Brewer: Recklessness Standard for Punitive Damages
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court affirmed in a five to four decision."5 All the Justices
agreed that punitive damages were available in a proper case under section
1983.16 The harder issue, however, concerned the proper standard of culpabil-
ity for such an award.
In writing for the majority, Justice Brennan noted that there was little in
the legislative history of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 concerning
the availability of punitive damages.1 7 Consequently, he turned to the common
law for guidance. He surveyed American tort law from 1871 to the modern
era. Through a maze of judicial terminology describing culpability require-
ments, he concluded that then, as now, the prevailing law permitted punitive
awards without showing an actual intent to injure.18
The majority rejected Smith's argument that an intent standard is prefer-
able because it is less vague than a recklessness standard. Justice Brennan
explained that the recklessness standard has survived years of intense debate
and remains the most widely adopted standard of punitive liability in Ameri-
can tort law. 9 He could discern no reason why section 1983 defendants should
be given greater protection. Moreover, he observed that recklessness served as
punitive damages must be based on a stricter standard of wrongdoing than that neces-
sary for compensatory liability in the first instance. Id. at 787 (Gibson, J. dissenting).
This split of opinion reflects the confusion and divergence of opinion that has existed
among the courts of appeals concerning the appropriate standard for an award of puni-
tive damages. See supra note 5. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to quell this
confusion. 456 U.S. 924 (1982).
15. 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983). Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court,
which Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Justice Rehnquist filed
a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell joined. Justice
O'Connor filed a separate dissenting opinion.
16. Although the Supreme Court had not previously ruled on the availability of
punitive damages under section 1983, it had made clear that they might be available in
appropriate circumstances. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.l 1 (1978) (puni-
tive damages should be available for the specific purposes of deterring or punishing
violations of constitutional rights). In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980), the
Court made punitive damages available against federal officers for eighth amendment
violations, stating that it would be anomalous to allow punitive awards against state but
not federal officers. In City of Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981),
the Court held that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under § 1983.
The Court reasoned that deterrence of constitutional violations would be adequately
accomplished by allowing punitive damage awards directly against the responsible indi-
viduals. Id. at 269-270.
17. 103 S. Ct. at 1628.
18. See, e.g., Philadelphia, W. & B. R.R. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202,
214 (1858) (spirit of mischief or criminal indifference to civil obligations); Milwaukee
& St. P. Ry. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 493, 495 (1875) (reckless indifference equivalent to
an intentional violation, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption
of a conscious indifference to consequences); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 908(2) (1977) (conduct that is outrageous because of evil motive or reckless
indifference to the rights of others).
19. 103 S. Ct. at 1637; see J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIvE DAMAGES:
LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.01 (1979).
[Vol. 49
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the threshold standard for compensatory liability in this case. Consequently,
Justice Brennan concluded that any argument that the concept of recklessness
is too vague to deter misconduct should be applied to the compensatory stan-
dard since it is this standard to which officials should look in shaping their
conduct in the first place.2"
The majority then rejected Smith's argument that intent was required in
this case because the threshold for punitive damages must always be higher
than that for compensatory liability. Again, Justice Brennan found no support
for this proposition at common law. 1 More importantly, he explained that in
reality the standards are different; compensatory damages are awarded as a
matter of right, while punitive damage awards rest in the discretion of the
jury.22 Finally, the Court noted that punitive damages may be the only signifi-
cant remedy available in section 1983 actions where liability exists but the
victims cannot prove pecuniary injury.23
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, dis-
sented at length and concluded that section 1983 requires proof of intentional
injury before punitive damages are appropriate. He denied that the prevailing
standard during the Forty-second Congress was anything less than intent,24
and he relied on the traditional criticism of punitive damages to strengthen his
argument.25 Moreover, he pointed out that the plain language of section 1983
20. 103 S. Ct. at 1637.
21. Id. at 1638.
22. Id.; see D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 204
(1973).
23. 103 S. Ct. at 1639 n.21; see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978)
(compensatory .damages are not allowed without proof of actual injury even if injuries
are difficult to prove).
24. 103 S. Ct. at 1650-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 1641; see, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872) ("The idea of
[punitive damages] is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and an un-
healthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law."). Many cases
remark that such damages have been traditionally disfavored in the law. See generally
25 C.J.S. Damages § 117(1), at 1114 n.18.5 (1966).
The debate over punitive damages continues to rage. Critics have levelled three
principal criticisms at punitive damages. First, punitive damages are a windfall to the
plaintiff, who ought to receive compensation but no more. Second, a punitive award is
criminal in nature but unaccompanied by the safeguards associated with a criminal
trial. Third, the permissible discretion allowed juries in awarding punitive damages is
outweighed by the costs, "such as the encouragement of unnecessary litigation and the
chilling of desirable conduct." 103 S. Ct. at 1642 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The defenders of punitive damages advance equally impressive arguments. Puni-
tive damages, they maintain, serve the important functions of punishment and deter-
rence, especially where the criminal justice system may be inadequate. They serve as
an incentive to sue when the defendant's conduct was egregious, but the prosecutor is
too busy to notice and the wronged individual otherwise would not find a lawsuit worth
the trouble. Punitive damages may also provide compensation for injuries that are diffi-
cult to prove. Finally, the jury's discretion is not unbridled; the award is assessed under
the supervision of the court which may reduce the award or order a new trial. For the
pros and cons of punitive damages, see D. DOBBS, supra note 22, § 3.9; W. PROSSER,
1984]
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provides only "for redress" of constitutional violations. Accordingly, he ques-
tioned whether the Forty-second Congress ever intended to allow anything
other than purely compensatory remedies.2 6 Even if Congress did intend to
allow punitive damages, Justice Rehnquist concluded that it would not have
intended as expansive a standard as recklessness. In contrast to the majority,
he eschewed the use of modern tort law in interpreting section 1983 to arrive
at the appropriate standard.2 7 He reasoned that cases decided after 1871 are
irrelevant to the intent of the Forty-second Congress. Consequently, he con-
cluded that the majority's reliance on post-1871 common law was a gross
deviation from fundamental statutory construction.2
Policy concerns with respect to section 1983 liability in general ultimately
explain Justice Rehnquist's preference for the more restrictive standard of in-
tent. He argued that by expanding potential liability, a recklessness standard
for punitive damages would erode the protection that qualified immunity af-
fords state officials.2 9 He cautioned that such an expansive standard would
create an imbalance in inducements to litigate since compensatory damages
and attorney's fees are already available in section 1983 actions. 30 As a result,
he warned, the number of frivolous section 1983 claims will continue to tax an
already overburdened judicial system.31
Justice O'Connor dissented in a separate opinion.32 She chastised both
Justice Brennan and Justice Rehnquist for their futile attempts to ascertain
the intent of the Forty-second Congress by examining the myriad of ambigu-
ous standards found in the case law in the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury.33 She thought policy considerations should control instead. While she did
not join in Justice Rehnquist's wholesale condemnation of punitive damages,
she did share his concern that a recklessness standard would have a chilling
effect on state officials and would unnecessarily increase the workload of the
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9-14 (4th ed. 1971); J. GHIARDI & J.
KIRCHER, supra note 19, § 2; C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES
§ 77 (1935); Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in
Present-Day Society, 49 UMKC L. REv. 1, 5-8 (1980).
26. 103 S. Ct. at 1655 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He also cited two other stat-
utes enacted by Congress about the same time as section 1983 was enacted. See 16
Stat. 198, 207 (1870); 12 Stat. 696, 698 (1863). Both included provisions for punitive
damages in the form of civil fines. Consequently, Justice Rehnquist concluded that "if
Congress wanted to subject persons to a punitive remedy it did so explicitly." 103 S.
Ct. at 1655 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
27. 103 S. Ct. at 1645 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1656-57 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 1657-58. The Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976 pro-
vides that the prevailing party in a section 1983 action may recover "a reasonable
attorneys fee." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
31. 103 S. Ct. at 1658 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see notes 50 & 52 infra.
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federal courts.
3 4
Justice O'Connor is correct in pointing to the futility of arguing congres-
sional intent in the absence of relevant legislative history. In 1871, the law on
punitive damages was ambiguous and unsettled. 5 Therefore, it is no surprise
that Justice Brennan and Justice Rehnquist could cite several identical Su-
preme Court decisions from the late nineteenth century for their respective
positions.3 6 Nor is it surprising that Justice Brennan concluded that a large
majority of the states required only a showing of recklessness, while Justice
Rehnquist concluded that a solid majority required intentional injury.3 7 In
34. Id. at 1659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
35. The required culpability was characterized as "wilfulness, wantoness, mali-
ciousness, gross negligence or recklessness, opression, outrageous conduct, indignity and
contumely, insult or fraud or gross fraud." 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 249 (1965).
There were several types of "malice" all representing different standards. Id. § 250.
The only agreement was that something more than mere negligent misconduct was
required. See supra note 5 (confusion in federal courts).
36. Justice Rehnquist concluded that Philadelphia, W. & B. R.R. v. Quigly, 62
U.S. (21 How.) 202 (1858) did not stand for a recklessness requirement, as Justice
Brennan-had argued. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. He argued that the
criminal nature of punitive damages implied a criminal mental state requirement.
Therefore, "criminal indifference" should be read as requiring wrongful intent. 103 S.
Ct. at 1646-1647 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan refuted this position by
noting that crimes such as manslaughter required merely reckless conduct to create
liability. 103 S. Ct. at 1632 n.9; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955) (criminal liability often rests on recklessness, and for some offenses even negli-
gence). Also contrary to Justice Brennan's interpretation, Justice Rehnquist read Mil-
waukee & St. P. R.R. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, as requiring proof of intent. He argued
that Arms merely allowed recklessness as circumstantial evidence of an evil motive and
not as a standard for liability. 103 S. Ct. at 1648 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Two major nineteenth century treatises also disagreed over the standard followed
by the contemporary Supreme Court. Compare A. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE
MEASURE OF DAMAGES 526 (8th ed. 1891) (recklessness is only evidence of evil motive
and not the standard for liability) with 12 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW 13 n.13, 24 n.2 (2d ed. 1899) (reckless conduct will support an award of punitive
damages).
The differences may be reconcilable. It seems both positions are just rejecting an
objective standard for punitive liability in favor of a subjective one. An evil motive does
not necessarily require an intent to harm; conscious indifference is sufficient, and this is
generally provable only by evidence of reckless conduct. See W. PROSSER, supra note
25, at 185. Thus recklessness, in the sense of requiring a subjective awareness of a risk
of harm appears to have been the prevailing standard. This is the standard the Court
adopted in Smith. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
37. Most commentators described the prevailing standard in the states as one of
recklessness. See 12 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 13, 21-31 (2d
ed. 1899); J. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 723-24 (1883). But
see A. SEDGWICK, supra note 36, at 526 (actual malice is required to sustain an award
of punitive damages).
The contrary conclusions by Justice Brennan and Justice Rehnquist stem largely
from their different definitions of the terms "willful" and "wanton." See 103 S. Ct.
1631 n.8. Justice Rehnquist incorrectly attributed to these terms an evil motive requir-
ing an intent to harm. It is generally accepted, however, that "willful" and "wanton"
7
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view of this confusion, it is impossible to assume that the Forty-second Con-
gress intended one standard or the other."8
Justice Brennan sidestepped the brunt of Justice O'Connor's criticisms by
resting his decision in large measure on modern tort law, in which the prevail-
ing punitive standard clearly is recklessness.3" It was this reliance on modern
tort law that sharply divided the Court. While Justice Rehnquist argued that
case law decided after 1871 is irrelevant in determining congressional inten4 ,
Justice Brennan presimed that Congress intended to incorporate generally ap-
plicable legal principles as they evolved.41
Three observations indicate that Justice Brennan's methodology is sound.
First, it is doubtful that Congress would want to perpetuate tort law
priniciples that become obsolete. It is generally accepted that section 1983 was
intended to create a "species of tort liability," 42 and it is axiomatic that stan-
dards of tort liability must change as social realities evolve. Congress has pro-
vided guidance on this issue. Section 1988 directs the courts to look to the
common law of the states whenever "necessary to furnish suitable remedies"
under section 1983. 4s
Second, the methodology Justice Brennan employed has guided the
Court's interpretation of section 1983 since Monroe v. Pape.4" In Monroe, Jus-
tice Douglas announced that section 1983 "should be read against the back-
are practically indistinguishable from "reckless disregard." See W. PROSSER, supra
note 25, at 9-14; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 Special note (1977).
38. Justice O'Connor, commenting on the incredible survey of the common law
undertaken by Justices Brennan and Rehnquist, stated that "the battle of string cita-
tions can have no winner." 103 S. Ct. at 1659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But measured
by sheer numbers, Justice Rehnquist gets the nod. He cited 78 decisions from 27 states,
one of the largest footnotes in the Supreme Court's history. See 103 S. Ct. at 1651 n.12
(Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977); J. GHIARDI & J.
KIRCHER, supra note 19, § 4.02. Even Justice Rehnquist conceded that in recent years
many courts have adopted the recklessness standard. 103 S. Ct. at 1651 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
40. Id. at 1645.
41. 103 S. Ct. at 1628-29 n.2.
42. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976); accord Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 n.13
(1978) (relying on section 1988 to justify reliance on state tort law in construing sec-
tion 1983); Zarcone v. Perry 572 F.2d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1978) (application of common
law leading to availability of punitive awards under section 1983 is based on section
1988); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 85-86 (3d. Cir. 1965) (same). But see Eisenberg,
State Law in Federal Civil Rights Cases: The Proper Scope of Section 1988, 128 PA.
L. REV. 499 (1980) (section 1988 was not meant as a general instruction to fill gaps in
federally created causes of action with state rules, but was intended only to apply to
actions removed from state to federal court).
44. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See generally S. NAHMOD, supra note 2; Nahmod,
Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974); Whit-
man, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 14-21 (1980).
[Vol. 49
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ground of tort liability. ' 45 Recent Court decisions involving questions of liabil-
ity46 and immunity47 have adhered to this approach in interpreting section
1983.
Third, it is sensible to apply modern tort principles to section 1983.
Courts and litigants alike are familiar with them.48 Because legislative history
with respect to damages is scant, reliance on modern tort law enhances
predictability. 4
9
While the majority's methodology may have been sound, the costs of im-
plementing the resulting standard were virtually ignored. A major recurring
concern for section 1983 liability is its effect on the federal case load.50 Unlike
the successful plaintiff in a tort action, a successful section 1983 plaintiff is
45. 365 U.S. at 187.
46. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257, 258 (1978) (common law of
damages provides "appropriate starting point for the inquiry under § 1983"); Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 231-232 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (applica-
tion of tort doctrines concerning mental elements for the existence and amount of lia-
bility appropriate when construing section 1983). But see City of Newport v. Fact Con-
certs, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981) (an underlying assumption of Court's decisions is
that the forty-second Congress intended then contemporary common law tort principles
to control).
47. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418, 421 (1976) (section 1983
immunity doctrine to be fashioned in harmony with general principles of tort immu-
nity); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 n.9 (1975) (section 1983 to be construed
by "common law traditions"); Piersen v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-557 (1967) (citing
both historical and modern tort law). But see Tenney v. Brandenhove, 341 U.S. 367,
376 (1951) (Court limits inquiry to common law prior to 1871).
48. See S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 61; Whitman, supra note 44, at 18.
49. See Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 86 (3d Cir. 1965); Caperci v. Huntoon,
397 F.2d 799, 801 (Ist Cir. 1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968);
Whitman, supra note 44, at 12.
50. 103 S. Ct. at 1657-1658 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 1659 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); see Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 554 n.13 (1980) (Powell, J., dis-
senting) (expansion of section 1983 to encompass negligent conduct increases the fed-
eral case load and hence dilutes the federal court's ability to defend significant consti-
tutional rights); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 23 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(overburdened federal courts is a reason for narrowly construing section 1983); Wis-
consin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 443 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (docket
congestion justifies abstention).
Congress has also shown concern. See Municipal Liability under 42 U.S.C. §
1983; Hearings on S. 585, & S. 990 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1981) (statement of Sen.
Thurmond) (hearings on proposed amendments to section 1983 reflect concern about
the number of cases).
Even sympathetic critics mention the burdens that section 1983 imposes on the
federal courts. See Nahmod, The Mounting Attack on Section 1983 and the 14th
Amendment, 67 A.B.A. J. 1586 (1981); Whitman, supra note 44, at 5, 6, (1980). But
see Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 COR-
NELL L. REV. 482, 523-524 (1982) (volume of section 1983 cases no serious threat to
federal court system and neither the number nor the nature of section 1983 cases jus-
tify major doctrinal change).
9
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entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. 5 ' The availability of punitive damages
adds additional incentive to litigate. Section 1983 already accounts for a stag-
gering number of lawsuits each year.5' The ready availability of punitive dam-
ages can only exacerbate the burden on the federal courts by increasing the
number of frivolous section 1983 claims.5 3
A second significant concern is the effect of a recklessness standard on
qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects state officials from section
1983 liability for coiduct that "does not violate clearly established" rights."
The rationale underlying the Supreme Court's immunity decisions is the belief
that the threat of personal liability interferes with official initiative and judg-
ment,55 and discourages qualified persons from seeking public positions."
Therefore, the specter of huge and unpredictable punitive awards on a showing
of recklessness undermines this policy by threatening additional liability.
The Smith majority justified its decision by focusing on the increased de-
terrence provided by a recklessness standard. Although society clearly has an
important interest in deterring all reckless misconduct, this deterrence should
not be bought at any cost.57 In any event, much of the force of the majority's
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
52. State prisoners alone filed 16,741 section 1983 claims in 1982. This is twice
the number filed in 1977 and nearly eight times as many as were filed in 1970. AN-
NUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATORS OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS
102-103 (1983).
53. It is readily conceded that restricting frivolous claims necessarily restricts
some meritorious claims as well. In addition, injuries resulting from violations of feder-
ally protected rights are often difficult to prove, and consequently, in the light of the
Court's decision in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1979) (restricting compensatory
recovery to provable injury), punitive damages may be the only significant remedy
available to that class of plaintiffs who are unable to prove actual injury. Moreover,
consistent with Justice Brennan's reasoning, the constitutional guarantees protected by
section 1983 are more jealously guarded than those interests protected by tort law. See
Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 11
(1974). Therefore, an army of private attorneys general as guardians of these closely
held rights seems desirable. Finally, the third circuit has suggested that punitive dam-
ages may be more significant today than ever in view of recent Supreme Court deci-
sions curtailing the power of the federal courts to grant injunctive relief in section 1983
cases. See Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 105-106 (3d Cir 1978). See generally
S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 80-85; McClellan & Northcross, Remedies and Damagesfor Violation of Constitutional Rights, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 509, 566 (1980).
In answer to these countervailing concerns, it should be remembered that the ar-
gument is not for eliminating punitive damages, but merely for a less expansive stan-
dard in awarding them. Punitive damages would still be available to redress particu-
larly egregious constitutional violations.
54. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982) (state officials are pro-
tected from liability for damages as long as their "conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights").
55. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
56. See 103 S. Ct. at 1657 n.16 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
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deterrence argument is diminished by the availability of insurance against an
award of punitive damages in a section 1983 action.58 While many states pro-
hibit insurers from providing coverage against punitive damages in tort ac-
lions,59 courts generally hold that public policy does not preclude coverage in a
section 1983 action. 0 Thus, in section 1983 actions, a recklessness standard
buys little additional deterrence."'
58. The insurance issue is conspicuously absent from Justice Brennan's opinion.
59. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962)
(against public policy in Florida and Virginia since defeats purpose of deterrence and is
analogous to insuring against criminal penalties); Brown v. Western Casualty & Sur.
Co., 448 P.2d 1252 (Colo. App. 1971); Crull v. Gibb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App.
1964); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966); LaRocco v. New
Jersey Manuf. Indem. Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197 A.2d 591 (1964). But see
Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964);
Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Ore. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977); Price v. Hart-
ford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522, 523 (1972). See generally
J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 19, §§ 7.11-7.14.
60. See Harris v. Racine County, 512 F. Supp. 1273, 1283 (E.D. Wis. 1981)
(encourages enforcement and avoids the chilling effect on official performance); Fagot
v. Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342, 344 (E.D. La. 1978) (in section 1983 case of police
liability, public policy does not proscribe insurance coverage for punitive damages). But
see Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d 218, 397
N.E.2d 737, 422 N.Y.S. 2d 47 (1979) (public policy prohibits coverage of punitive
damages in a civil rights action brought against municipal officers). See generally
Note, Limiting the Role of Insurance in Civil Rights Litigation: As an Enforcement
Mechanism, 5 J. CORP. L. 305 (1980).
61. It is clear that insurance may cover punitive damages in a section 1983
action arising out of reckless conduct; it is less clear whether it may also cover conduct
evincing an intent to cause injury. Though there is no case law involving section 1983
that makes the distinction, if insurance were permitted for reckless but not intentional
conduct, Justice Brennan's recklessness standard would anomalously provide less deter-
rence than an intent standard. While such a distinction is unlikely, it is plausible that,
had the Court adopted an intent standard, insurance coverage may have been denied as
against public policy, substantially boosting deterrence. There is little case law respect-
ing insurance against punitive damages under section 1983, and the little that is availa-
ble is not entirely consistent. See supra note 60. Though the states are split on the
availability of insurance for punitive damages, many states make the distinction be-
tween intent and recklessness in allowing coverage. See City Prods. Corp. v. Globe
Indem. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 151 Cal. Rptr. 494, 500-501 (1979) (limiting restric-
tion on coverage of punitive damages to intentional injury, e.g., malicious prosecution);
City of Newark v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 134 N.J. Super. 537, 342 A.2d
513 (1975) (punitive damage coverage violates public policy when city is liable for
false arrest, detention or imprisonment, and malicious prosecution).
In addition, the procoverage position is strongest in cases where recklessness will
sustain a punitive award. See Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d
1013, 1021 (1977); J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 19, § 7.14, at 55. Moreover,
those states that require intent for a punitive recovery uniformly prohibit coverage.
City Prods. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 151 Cal. Rptr. 494, 500-
510 (1979). Ironically then, based on the common law, an intent standard would have
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The foregoing concerns justify at least slight modification in the common
law. While punitive damages should not be rejected entirely, they should be
limited to intentional misconduct. Under an intentional standard, punitive
awards remain available for particularly egregious constitutional violations,
the spirit of the common law is preserved, and policies underlying section 1983
liability are protected. Nevertheless, the majority adopted the prevailing com-
mon law precisely. Consequently, practitioners must look to this standard of
recklessness to anticipate the impact of Smith v. Wade on civil rights
litigation.
The Smith standard for punitive liability is subjective.6 2 The requisite
state of mind may be characterized as conscious disregard or deliberate indif-
ference. Three elements must be present for conduct to meet the recklessness
standard: (1) an intentional act, (2) a substantial probability that the act will
cause injury, and (3) actual awareness of the risk of injury.6 3 Each of these
elements distinguish the Court's standard from negligence. Negligence may be
shown when the act is inadvertent, the risk merely foreseeable, or the actor
unaware. 4 Negligence does not require an inquiry into the actor's state of
mind; instead, the actor's conduct is measured by an external, objective stan-
dard of reasonableness. The Court's standard may be clarified further by not-
ing that it differs from the intent standard advocated by the Smith dissent
only in the likelihood of injury required.6 5 While recklessness requires
probability, intent demands substantial certainty. Both standards, however, re-
62. See 103 S. Ct. at 1630 n.6. While RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
(1972) states that there are two types of reckless conduct, one subjective and one objec-
tive, id. § 500 comment a, it seems to restrict reckless conduct sufficient to sustain
punitive damages to a subjective standard. Id. § 908 comment b (requires outrageous
conduct similar to that usually found in a crime; evil motive or reckless indifference
may supply necessary state of mind). The requisite common law state of mind for puni-
tive damages is closely associated with criminal recklessness, requiring subjective con-
sciousness. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); W. LAFAVE &
A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 30 (1972). But as a practical matter even
recklessness requiring conscious awareness often becomes an objective standard. It is a
rare instance when a defendant will admit to conscious indifference. Consequently, this
state of mind must be inferred from conduct and circumstances demonstrating an en-
tire want of care, hence some objective standard of reasonableness is required. See W.
LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra at 212; W. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 185.
63. See 103 S. Ct. at 1630 n.6, 1631 n.8; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §
500 comment a (1977); W. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 9, 184-185; W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTT, supra note 62, at 208-216.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 500 comment g (1977); W. LAFAvE
& A. ScoTT, supra note 62, at 215; W. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 32.
65. Justice Brennan claimed that Justice Rehnquist had confused the standards
by blending together the distinct concepts of "intent to cause" injury, on the one hand,
and "subjective consciousness" of the risk of injury on the other. 103 S. Ct. at 1630
n.6. He correctly pointed out that consciousness of wrongdoing does not require injuri-
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quire an intentional act and subjective consciousness by the actor.66
After Smith v. Wade, plaintiffs' attorneys should request punitive dam-
ages in most section 1983 cases. Official misconduct necessary for compensa-
tory liability will often be sufficient to meet the Smith standard, and hence
trigger consideration of punitive damages. Although section 1983 imposes no
express state of mind requirement, 67 a number of constitutional deprivations
clearly imply one.6 8 An eighth amendment violation requires recklessness, 9
while both sixth amendment 0 and equal protection violations71 require intent.
At least for these constitutional deprivations, therefore, punitive liability is a
necessary concomitant to compensatory liability.
72
In addition, although the Supreme Court has implied that negligence is
sufficient to support a due process claim,7 3 it has yet to find section 1983 liabil-
ity based on negligence.7 14 The lower courts have been reluctant to do so as
66. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 500 comment f (1977); W. PROS-
SER, supra note 44, at 9: W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 62, at 215.
67. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). All that is required for the
"initial inquiry" into section 1983 liability is: (1) whether the conduct complained of
was under color of state law, and (2) whether the conduct deprived a person of four-
teenth amendment or federal statutory rights, privileges, or immunities. Id. at 535. See
generally Esbeck, Current Practice Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 10 BARRISTER 31
(1983).
68. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 547 (Powell, J., concurring); Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137, 140 n.1 (1979) (defendant's state of mind relevant to existence of consti-
tutional violation apart from the section 1983 inquiry); Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor:
Opening and Closing the Door on Section 1983, 9 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 545, 566 (1982)
(eighth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendment violations require state of mind); see also
S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 65 (possible that violation of the same constitutional
provision may in different circumstances require different states of mind).
69. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) ("deliberate indifference" re-
quired to constitute infliction of cruel and unusual punishment).
70. Weatherford v. Bursay, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (either intent to intercept law-
yer-client conversations or their subsequent intentional use required to make out sixth
amendment violation).
71. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977) (invidious discriminatory purpose required for claim of racial discrimination
under the equal protection clause); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
72. See Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 785 (8th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 103 S. Ct.
1625 (1983).
73. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 532-35 (1981).
74. Id. at 533. The Court in Parratt held that adequate state tort remedies
satisfied due process. Id. at 543. Until Parratt, the Court had avoided the question of
whether negligence could support a section 1983 claim. See Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 139-140, 146-47 (1979) (negligent wrongful detention not violation of due
process); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1978) (finding qualified immu-
nity bar to section 1983 claim based on negligent interference with prisoner's outgoing
mail); Paul v. Davis 424 U.S. 693, 711-14 (1976) (no deprivation of due process result-
ing from defamatory publication circulated by police). At least three of the current
Justices have argued that negligence will not support a section 1983 claim. See Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 546 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring); Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 147 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (reprehensible conduct is an element
1984]
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well . The fundamental section 1983 requirement of causation, 76 the availa-
bility of adequate state tort remedies,7 the requirement of provable injury,7 8
and the state of mind requirement for certain constitutional violations, 9 all
tend to defeat negligence claims. Many more negligence claims will be de-
feated by qualified immunity. 0 To overcome the immunity defense, the plain-
tiff must show that the right violated was clearly established.81 Since evidence
sufficient to hurdle qualified immunity necessarily tends to support conscious
awareness by the government official, the judge ordinarily should not withhold
the question of punitive liability from the jury. The Supreme Court recently
pared the good faith, subjective, element from the qualified immunity defense
because it rarely could be decided on summary judgment.8 2 The good faith
inquiry is the same as the inquiry for punitive damages under Smith.8 3 By
under section 1983); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 568 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (no liability under section 1983 absent intent or callous indifference). The
Court has expressed concern that if negligence were a proper basis of section 1983
liability, then section 1983 would in effect become a federal tort law, engulfing or mak-
ing irrelevant state tort law involving government officials as defendants. See, e.g., Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1976) (section 1983 negligence liability would make
fourteenth amendment a "font of tort law" to be superimposed over state systems). In
Baker, the Court described the relationship between negligence and sedtion 1983 as
"more elusive than it appears at first blush. It may well not be susceptible of a uniform
answer across the entire spectrum of conceivable constitutional violations which might
be the subject of a § 1983 action." 443 U.S. 137, 139-40.
75. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 549 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring)
("overwhelming number" of lower courts reject due process claims premised on negli-
gence); see also, e.g., Williams v. Kelley, 624 F.2d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1980) (section
1983 liability requires the defendant's act be intentional or in reckless disregard of
plaintiff's constitutional rights). But see Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 367
(7th Cir. 1980) (Swygert, J., concurring) (improper arrest based on negligent issue of
warrant actionable), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 604 (1981).
76. See Friedman, supra note 68, at 563-64. Negligence is not actionable unless
it causes a constitutional deprivation. Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 698
(1976) (dicta) (no cognizable section 1983 claim against sheriff for negligent driving
since no constitutional issue at stake) with Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th
Cir. 1980) (cognizable claim against sheriff who imprisoned plaintiff because he erro-
neously believed that certain costs had not been paid).
77. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981).
78. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1979).
79. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
80. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 556-566 (1978).
81. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Although Harlow was a
Bivens-type action against federal officers, the Supreme Court implied that the same
immunity standard would apply to section 1983 defendants. Id. at 819 n.30.
82. Id. at 816-818. The Court eliminated the good faith defense so that insub-
stantial claims could be defeated without constant recourse to trial. Id. When it can be
shown that the right violated was "clearly established," a reasonable inference is that
the defendant was aware of such a right.
83. The good faith defense for qualified immunity that had been available
under Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), rested on the same standard of culpa-
bility as the Court approved in Smith. Ladnier v. Murray, 572 F. Supp. 544, 547 (D.
Md. 1983).
14
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analogy, therefore, when the plaintiff can show deprivation by a government
official of a clearly established constitutional right, he ordinarily will be able to
get the question of punitive damages to the jury.
Punitive damages premised on a showing of recklessness, also should be
available in other civil rights actions. A showing of recklessness triggers con-
sideration of punitive damages under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968.814 Furthermore, since the federal courts usually apply the rules developed
under section 1983 in Bivens-type cases,8 5 the recklessness standard will apply
to federal officers as well.86 The recklessness standard for punitive liability also
should apply to civil rights actions under sections 1981 and 1982.87 Finally,
although its application is less clear in other civil rights actions, the reckless-
ness standard, in all likelihood, will become a constant in federal civil rights
law.
The Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Wade flows from familiar prin-
ciples of tort law. Unfortunately, it virtually ignores the serious policy conse-
quences attendant in a strict application of the prevailing tort law to section
1983 liability. While it might have seemed anomalous to set a higher threshold
in section 1983 than in tort, an intent standard would have adequately served
the purposes of section 1983 without departing drastically from the example at
common law.
Adoption of the recklessness standard reflects the Court's confidence in
jurors' notions of fairness. In nearly all instances of actionable civil rights vio-
lations, the question of whether punitive damages are appropriate will be left
to the jury. Therefore, the jury becomes a powerful force in the policing of
civil rights.
GARY B. BREWER
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1979) (the award is limited to $1,000); Fountilla v.
Carter, 571 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1978).
85. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
86. See Ellis v. Blum, 643 F.2d 68, 84 (3d Cir. 1981) (practice to incorporate
section 1983 law into Bivens suit); see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980)
(suggesting that identical rules should govern the availability of punitive damages in
section 1983 and Bivens actions).
87. Damage rules developed under section 1983 are regularly applied to sec-
tions 1981 and 1982. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229
(1969) (federal rules on damages applied to section 1982); Heritage Homes of Att-
leboro, Inc. v. Seekonk Water Dist. 670 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1982) (based on Newport v.
Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), a section 1983 case, punitive damages like-
wise not available against municipalities in section 1981 actions), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
985 (1982). But see Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp. 429 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir.
1970) (wanton, oppressive, or malicious conduct required for punitive damages under
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